THE PRESERVATION OF WHITENESS
On April 9, 1924, Senator Ellison DuRant "Cotton Ed" Smith (D-South Carolina) stood before members of the US Congress and delivered an impassioned speech in favor of what would become the Immigration Act of 1924. The law proposed a quota system that would limit the number of new immigrants to the United States from any country to just 2 percent of the number of people from that country who were already residing in the United States. It was an unabashed effort to further restrict immigration to the United States from Southern and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and India. There was little doubt that its intention was to reduce immigration from countries whose citizens were not considered "white" by the standards of the time. Arguing in support of the legislation, Smith proclaimed that it was time for America to "shut the door" to any further influx of foreigners, and for the nation to instead focus on increasing its population of "pure, unadulterated American" citizenry (Speech by Ellison DuRant Smith 1924). Smith's speech made clear the significance of race in defining such citizenship:
Thank God we have in America perhaps the largest percentage of any country in the world of the pure, unadulterated AngloSaxon stock; certainly the greatest of any nation in the Nordic breed. It is for the preservation of that splendid stock that has characterized us that I would make this not an asylum for the oppressed of all countries, but a country to assimilate and perfect that splendid type of manhood that has made America the foremost Nation in her progress and in her power.
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The legislation was passed into law with strong support; only six senators dissented. The majority view of Congress reflected the broader national discourse on citizenship and national identity of the timea conversation that largely centered on the belief that Anglo-Saxon heritage should be the prevailing criteria for entry into the United States and whiteness the defining characteristic of American identity (Jacobson 1999) . 1 In response to the passage of the Act, the Los Angeles Times published an article on April 13, 1924 with the headline "Nordic Victory is seen in Drastic Restrictions."
The history of immigration in the United States is intricately tied to the notion of whiteness. Americans have routinely resisted opening the country's borders to foreigners, especially when those arriving are not, by the current standards, considered white. But in contemporary debates, immigration opponents often frame the issue as an economic problem; immigrants, they argue, take jobs from American citizens, depress wages, and are a heavy burden on the social welfare system. In this chapter, I take up whether immigration attitudes are primarily about economic concerns -either personal or national in nature -or if, instead, immigration opinion is largely driven by group attitudes. In particular, I examine whether opposition to immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments are motivated, at least in part, by whites' sense of racial solidarity. My expectation is that immigration is an issue that cuts to the heart of whites' concerns about their group's status atop the nation's hierarchy. Consequently, white racial solidarity ought to strongly and consistently predict more negative attitudes toward immigration.
to Senator Kennedy's expectations, the Act would eventually have an enormous impact on the racial and ethnic composition of the United States. As Figure 6 .1 shows, with the national quotas lifted and the nation's doors more open, immigration began to increase notably in the 1980s and 1990s, before exploding in the early and mid 2000s. This growth was impressive. In 1979 the immigrant share of the population was just under 5 percent. By 1990, the percentage had increased to nearly 8 percent. In 2005, immigrants comprised 12.4 percent of the population, and today they make up 13.5 percent -just shy of the share in the early 1900s that preceded the restrictive immigration legislation of the 1920s. More than forty-one million immigrants live in the United States today -a number that is four times as many as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s. Note: Bars represent the total number of foreign-born individuals living in the United States (in millions). Line represents the percentage of the total population that is foreign born. Data from 2000 to 2015 from www.census.gov. Foreign-born population includes anyone who is not a US citizen at birth, including those who become US citizens through naturalization. Percentage is the foreign-born population as a percent of the total population.
Source: Data from 1900 to 1990 from Gibson and Lennon. US Bureau of the Census (www.census.gov/ population/ www/ documentation/ twps0029/ tab01.html).
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The wave of immigrants that arrived in the United States between the 1960s and today were mostly from Latin America and South or East Asia. These trends are quite a change from previous immigration patterns; most immigrants to the United States in the 1960s and 1970s were from Europe.
8 Today, immigrants from Mexico make up 28 percent of the foreign-born population and comprise the largest single share of immigrants. Those arriving from South or East Asia are not far behind, comprising 26 percent of the foreign-born population.
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As the population of immigrants has grown, it has become apparent that explicit discussion of whiteness, immigration, and citizenship, is not a relic of a distant era in which racial prejudice was more widely accepted. Such debates, it seems, are inevitably rehashed each time the United States experiences a new wave of immigration. The most recent period is no exception. Political scientist Samuel Huntington (2004), for example, warned that the influx of Latinos to the United States presents "the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America's traditional identity" (p. 2). Huntington left no doubt as to the exact nature of this identity when he asked, "[w] ill the U.S. remain a country with a single national language and a core Anglo-Protestant culture" (p. 2)? A number of other scholars and political pundits, including Victor Davis Hanson (2003 ), Francis Fukuyama (1993 ), Peter Brimelow (1996 , and Patrick Buchanan (2011) have joined Huntington in lamenting what they argue are the dangers of multiculturalism, the rise of group identity politics, and the failure of new immigrant groups to assimilate to the dominant American culture.
10 They contend that bilingualism, the election of non-white politicians, population displacement, and even challenges to "racial purity" are all threats to white Americans posed by "the browning of America."
Many of these same individuals have predicted a backlash among white Americans in response to the changes spurred by immigration. Huntington claimed that initiatives against illegal immigrants, affirmative action, and bilingual education are just a few examples of whites' negative responses. 11 Similarly, political scientist Carol Swain argued that a rise in white nationalism and white racial consciousness is a clear symptom of whites' concern over Latino immigration. She proposed that such a reaction would be "the next logical stage for identity politics in America" (Swain 2002, p. 423) .
In this chapter, I put the claims of Huntington, Swain, and others to the test by investigating the extent to which contemporary white Americans perceive immigration as a threat to their cultural and racial dominance. If, as I have argued, white identity is now routinely salient, and if immigration is a source of threat to whites' status, then whites who identify with their racial group should be far more restrictive in their immigration opinion, and they should believe that the consequences of immigration are more negative than positive. In fact, white identity should be one of the most powerful and consistent drivers of immigration opinion today.
The Threat to White Dominance
Immigration is exceptional in the degree to which it may be perceived as a challenge to whites' dominant status. For one, some whites might view large influxes of foreigners with unfamiliar cultures and language as a realistic threat to the nation's status quo. In other words, the mass introduction of new languages, food, and cultural traditions may very well serve to displace the country's dominant culture. Today, immigration is framed as a threat. Immigrants, critics argue, take American jobs, raise crime rates in communities, and change American culture. But immigration is also a unique threat specifically because race has been so significantly implicated in citizenship policies over the course of the nation's history. Efforts to accommodate immigrants who are not part of the country's Anglo-centric culture may be viewed as directly threatening white Americans' cultural hegemony (Kaufmann 2004) . Higham (1955) described how past nativistic responses among white Americans toward European immigrants were more common when immigrants challenged the order and dominance of Anglo-Saxon Americans. Furthermore, whiteness has been so central to American citizenship that previous immigrant groups, especially those from Southern and Eastern Europe, deliberately came to identify as "white" terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108645157.006 161 / The Preservation of Whiteness 1 6 1 in order to distance themselves from Chinese immigrants and African Americans (Saxton 1975) . The notion that immigrants adopted a white identity in order to gain political and social acceptance in America has now been broadly documented by historians (Brodkin 1998; Ignatiev 1995; King 2000; Roediger 2006) . While today's Latino immigrants may eventually follow the path laid out by nineteenth-and early twentiethcentury European immigrants, eventually becoming subsumed under a white identity, this transformation has not yet occurred.
12

White Opposition to Immigration
Americans have never been especially enthusiastic about immigration. In 1965, pollsters began asking what became an ongoing time-series question about whether immigration should be increased, decreased, or kept at its present level. 13 At that time, only 7 percent preferred an increase in immigration, 39 percent preferred immigration to remain at its present level, and 33 percent wanted to see immigration decreased.
14 At no point in the time trend has a preference for increasing immigration surpassed a penchant to maintain or decrease current levels. When we look at immigration preferences only among white Americans in more recent years, we observe similar patterns. Figure 6 .2 presents attitudes about immigration levels between 1992 and 2016 among whites in the ANES Time Series. While support for decreasing immigration has declined somewhat since a peak in 1994, most whites still prefer that fewer immigrants cross the country's borders. In 2016, approximately 49 percent of whites wanted to see immigration decreased.
An impressive body of research has sought to explain what drives opposition to immigration, especially among whites, who are far more opposed to immigration than other Americans (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Schuman et al. 1985) . 15 Generally, explanations fall into two camps. The first focuses on the economic burdens immigrants place on the nation's citizens. It examines increased opposition to immigration at the aggregate level during economic downturns (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Foner 1964; Higham 1955; Lapinski et al. 1997; Olzak 1992; Simon and Alexander 1993) . Other work uncovers beliefs about immigrants burdening the welfare state, increasing taxation and social welfare spending (Calavita 162 / White Identity Politics 1 6 2 1996; Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Quillian 1995). Still other work has found some evidence that at the individual level, more economically vulnerable individuals tend to support more restrictive immigration policies (Abowd and Freeman 1991; Borjas and Freeman 1992) . Much of the research in this vein argues that individuals in occupational sectors or positions most likely to experience competition from immigrants are far more opposed to immigration (Clark and Legge 1997; Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 2007; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) . Some of the evidence with respect to the role of economic concerns in predicting opposition to immigration has been, however, inconsistent. For instance, political scientists Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) find little indication that individuals who are more likely to experience labor market competition with immigrants are significantly more opposed to immigration. They also find minimal support for the argument that wealthy citizens oppose immigration from low-skilled workers, who are more likely to burden the social welfare system and increase taxes. These results cast doubt on the claim that economic concerns are the driving force behind immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). A second line of work argues that opposition to immigration is not a product of real economic concerns, but instead a function of symbolic attitudes. This research argues that the same negative evaluations of groups that motivate public opinion in other domains apply to immigration opinion as well (Citrin et al. 1997; Nelson and Kinder 1996) . For instance, Citrin and colleagues (1997) find that beliefs about the state of the national economy and feelings about Hispanics and Asians -the main immigrant groups -are far more powerfully associated with immigration opinion than are individual economic circumstances. Sides and Citrin (2007) find that cultural and national identity, as well as references for cultural unity, outweigh the effect of economic dissatisfaction when it comes to explaining opposition to immigration across Europe. Other predispositions, like SDO and authoritarianism, appear to be related to immigration opinion as well (Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 2007) .
Much of the scholarship on immigration opinion focuses overwhelmingly on how out-group attitudes or hostilities motivate opposition to immigration. In other words, when whites dislike the specific groups they believe comprise the immigrant population, they are less supportive of immigration. There is certainly powerful evidence for this claim. Kinder and Kam (2010) demonstrate that in the 1990s, ethnocentrism -or prejudice toward racial out-groups writ large -was one of the most potent predictors of white opposition to immigration. Elsewhere, my colleagues and I demonstrated that in more recent years, the media's focus on Latino immigrants in particular has narrowed the effect of prejudicial attitudes; now hostility toward Hispanics (and less toward other groups) underlies support for more restrictive immigration policy (Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013) .
Unsurprisingly, the group-centric nature of immigration opinion means that hostility toward immigrants is not uniformly distributed. The trends described earlier in this chapter showed that Americans seem to have markedly different preferences for immigrants by region of origin. White Americans seem far less hostile to newcomers from places like England and Scandinavia -immigrants who look physically and culturally similar to themselves. Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) corroborate this argument; they find that news about the costs of immigration is far more likely to trigger anxiety and opposition among whites when the immigrants are Latino than when they are European.
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The claims I make here are consistent with much of this work, but they depart from previous efforts in a central way. Rather than focusing on how out-group hostility fuels immigration opinion, I instead focus on how whites' anxiety and concern for their in-group plays a fundamental role in opinion. Whites do not merely endorse more restrictive immigration policy out of animus toward Latinos, I argue; they are also concerned that the large influx of non-white immigrants threatens their dominance over America's culture and its political and economic institutions. It follows that immigrants from many European countries, therefore, seem far less threatening since they identify as (and are identified as) white. Of course, not all whites are especially opposed to immigration. What accounts for differences in opinion? If I am right, then even after accounting for out-group attitudes, we should find that whites with higher levels of racial identity possess far more restrictive attitudes toward immigration.
Testing the Link between White Identity and Immigration Opinion
To examine the relationship between white racial identity and immigration opinion, I turn to multiple sources: The 2010 KN Study, the 2012 ANES, the 2013 SSI Study, the 2016 ANES Pilot, and the 2016 ANES. If white racial identity is as central to immigration opinion as I claim, then we should observe a strong relationship between the two in multiple years, across samples, and with different measures of identity. We should also observe an even stronger link between immigration opinion and racial consciousness. And we should see these trends when it comes to a range of different immigration policies or efforts to limit immigration, as well as with respect to beliefs about the negative consequences of immigration. Employing multiple sources of evidence allows me to demonstrate the robustness of these claims.
In order to determine that white identity is in fact significantly associated with immigration opinion, all else equal, I account for several potentially competing explanations when appropriate measures are available. First, I consider the possibility that more economically vulnerable individuals, or those who are more likely to compete with immigrants for jobs or who may potentially feel financial strain from immigration, will be more supportive of restricting immigration. Accordingly, I control for employment status (employed 165 / The Preservation of Whiteness or unemployed), and subjective evaluations of how one's immediate family is doing financially. Yet, individual economic circumstances often play little to no role in public opinion (Sears and Funk 1990) . Instead, to the extent that economic evaluations matter, it is usually with respect to the national economy; thus, I control for these types of appraisals as well.
I also include a measure of Hispanic affect (measured with the 101-point feeling thermometer), since today, when most Americans think of immigrants, they are thinking of those of Hispanic origin (Pérez 2016; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013) . 16 And of course, we might expect how whites feel about Hispanics to factor into their opinion on immigration. Furthermore, I include opinion about the scope of government, on the idea that those who prefer less government involvement might also prefer that the government stay out of regulating immigration. Finally, I control for other demographic characteristics, including levels of education, age, and gender. These models are consistent with the "standard" model of public opinion I introduced in Chapter 3.
I begin by examining attitudes toward increasing, decreasing, or maintaining current levels of immigration in the 2012 ANES. Americans' attention to immigration grew dramatically in 2014, and as I will discuss more in Chapter 8, immigration remained near the top of the list of America's most important problems moving into 2016 with the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump. 17 In 2012, however, Americans in general were not especially concerned with immigration compared to other matters, such as the state of the national economy.
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Nevertheless, we might still expect that high white identifiers were disproportionately opposed to immigration compared to low-identifiers, even when immigration did not feel like a particularly pressing national problem.
The first panel (A) in Figure 6 .3 summarizes the results of a model in which white identity is regressed on attitudes about immigration levels, coded such that higher levels of the dependent variable indicate more restrictive views on immigration. 19 All variables in the model are coded to range from zero to one, and the model includes the control variables described above. The shaded bars represent the coefficients associated with each variable in the model, and the capped lines present the 95 percent confidence intervals. The coefficients reveal whether differences in white identity are systematically related to 167 / The Preservation of Whiteness 1 6 7 differences in opinion on immigration, while holding constant other considerations, like party identity, ideology, employment status, and so forth.
We can see in Figure 6 .3, by the fact that the confidence intervals for the white identity variable do not cross zero, that the coefficient on white identity is statistically distinguishable from zero. The magnitude of the effect is relatively modest -it is smaller than what we observe for other significant variables in the model, including political ideology, evaluations of the national economy, education, and attitudes toward Hispanics. Nevertheless, it is still a substantively meaningful effect. Moving from the lowest to the highest level of white identity is associated with a 10 percent increase in preferences for decreasing levels of immigration.
White identity, however, might not be the main identity through which Americans are filtering their immigration attitudes. Work on immigration opinion has suggested that Americans also view immigration as a threat to their national identity, and so perhaps it is this attachment that is mainly driving opinion (Citrin 2001; Citrin and Sears 2014; Citrin and Sides 2008; Citrin et al. 2007 ). Does white identity maintain its predictive power with respect to immigration opinion even after controlling for the extent to which whites think that their identity as an American is important? Panel (B) in Figure 6 .3 suggests that it does. Including American identity, which also significantly predicts immigration opinion, only slightly reduces the effect of white identity. These results suggest that white identity and American identity are not one and the same, and they independently influence whites' immigration opinion.
Next, I ask whether white identity maintains its predictive power when it comes to other attitudes about immigrants and immigration over time and across other sources of evidence. To find out, I examine the link between identity and a host of immigration attitudes across seven data sources. These studies include general questions about whether immigration should be increased or decreased, attitudes toward immigrants themselves, and opinions on policies intended to address immigration in some way. In each case, we would expect that white identifiers are far less supportive of increasing immigration than those whites who do not possess a racial identity. Importantly, we would expect that white consciousness is even more strongly linked to opposition to immigration than is white identity.
1 6 8 Table 6 .1 presents the coefficients on white identity and white consciousness when the two items are included in separate models predicting a range of ten different immigration attitudes. In this table I focus on how whites feel about immigration and immigrants more generally. The first thing to note is the remarkable consistency with which white identity and white consciousness are associated with immigration opinion, all else equal. Across every study, both forms of racial solidarity are linked with a preference for decreasing immigration. White identifiers are also more likely to think that immigration is an especially important issue, would prefer to increase federal spending to tighten border security, and support laws checking the status of immigrants. Whites with higher levels of racial solidarity also feel less warm toward "illegal" immigrants, and they favor building a wall with Mexico. What is more, in each case, we see that the magnitude of the coefficient on consciousness is even greater than it is for white identity. Whites with higher levels of racial consciousness are especially unfavorable toward immigration.
I note that if there is any ambivalence when it comes to immigration attitudes on the part of these whites, it is with respect to issues concerning the status of children. We see in the 2012 ANES that white identity is not significantly related to attitudes about allowing children brought to the United States illegally to become citizens. The coefficients are insignificant and close to zero. The results are also somewhat less consistent across studies when it comes to eliminating birthright citizenship for children of immigrants. These results may reflect more uncertainty about the issue of birthright citizenship generallyalthough I note that whites with higher levels of white consciousness even support changing the Constitution to eliminate the policy -or they may also reflect a degree of sympathy for children, who have little control over their immigrant status. Table 6 .2 reveals the relationship between white identity, white consciousness, and beliefs about the consequences of immigration. We should observe that those high on identity view immigration as having a largely negative effect on American citizens and society. Whites high on racial consciousness should take an even more pessimistic view. The results in Table 6 .2 paint a portrait of impressive consistency. In each case, even after accounting for a number of alternative explanations, both white identity and white consciousness are powerful predictors of opinion. Whites with higher levels of racial solidarity are more inclined Popular narratives about the influence of immigration do not merely focus on the potentially detrimental effect of immigration on American culture. Immigration opponents also claim that competition over jobs in the United States is a zero-sum game, and one that immigrants are winning. Whites with higher levels of racial solidarity, it seems, are inclined to believe these narratives. They agree that immigrants take jobs away from American citizens and that immigrants are bad for the US economy. They also believe that immigrants increase crime rates and are generally concerned about the changing ethnic makeup of the country.
These relationships are robust to controlling for both personal economic circumstances and sociotropic evaluations of the national economy. I find, as have others, that economic self-interest is only sporadically associated with immigration opinion -even when it comes to attitudes about the economic consequences of immigration -and the effect is often minimal. I also find, consistent with prior work, that negative national economic evaluations matter. Whites who believe the national economy has performed relatively poorly in recent years tend to be more opposed to immigration and to believe it has negative consequences. Republicans and conservatives tend to hold more anti-immigrant sentiments than Democrats and liberals, although the effects of partisanship and ideology are not always consistent or powerful. Whites on either end of the partisan aisle tend to have more anti-immigrant attitudes. And of course, whites with more negative evaluations of Hispanics are far more opposed to immigration.
Immigration opinion is also often a function of levels of education, suggesting that a more parochial view of the world might increase more anti-immigrant sentiment. Immigration attitudes seem to be driven less by age and attitudes about the scope of government. Gender matters on occasion, although the effects are generally small. To the extent that it does have an effect, women are often somewhat more opposed to immigration and likely to worry more about its consequences.
Even after taking these other factors into consideration, both white identity and white consciousness remain powerful predictors of terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108645157.006 1 7 3 immigration opinion. The magnitude of the effect of white solidarity on immigration opinion is noteworthy; moving from the lowest levels to the highest levels of racial solidarity usually shifts immigration in a more negative direction by at least 10 percentage points, if not more. More importantly, the effect of both types of racial solidarity rival or exceed some of the most powerful predictors of immigration attitudes. White identity and white consciousness are often as, if not more strongly, tied to immigration opinion than negative national economic evaluations, education, and attitudes toward Hispanics.
To illustrate the strength of these relationships more clearly, in Figure 6 .4, I plot, using the 2016 ANES, the predicted level of opinion, across levels of consciousness, for four immigration attitudes: preferences for increasing or decreasing immigration, support for building a wall along the border with Mexico, endorsement of the belief that immigrants take jobs from American citizens, and support for the notion that immigrants increase crime. We can see that in each case, moving from the lowest levels of consciousness to the highest produces a marked shift in immigration opinion. For instance, compared to whites low on consciousness, whites at the highest level of consciousness more greatly prefer to decrease immigration on an order of eighteen points. Scanning across the figure, we can see that the effect of white consciousness on each immigration opinion is a similar order of magnitude. In short, white consciousness has a potent effect on anti-immigrant attitudes.
Immigration Opinion over Time
The evidence presented here makes it difficult to deny that white identity and white consciousness play a significant role in how white Americans arrive at their immigration attitudes. Across studies conducted between 2010 and 2016, we see that both measures of racial solidarity consistently, strongly, and significantly predict immigration opinion. As expected, white identifiers are far more opposed to immigration and more likely to believe that immigration has negative consequences. Are these attitudes a recent phenomenon? Perhaps, if we were to step back in time, we would not necessarily observe such a strong link between identity and immigration.
Unfortunately, we cannot step too far back in time with available data. We can, however, get some purchase on the idea that white 1 7 4 in-group attitudes have played an increasingly powerful role in immigration opinion by turning to the ANES and exploring the relationship between white in-group affect -measured with the 101-point feeling thermometer -and immigration opinion between 1992 and 2016. The thermometer measure is an admittedly imperfect measure of identityit does not capture the centrality of a group identity as much as it does positive feelings toward the in-group. Nevertheless, we would expect that whites who feel especially favorable toward their own in-group Predicted values generated by holding gender constant at female and all other variables at their mean. Model also controls for party identity, ideology, employment status, personal and national financial economic evaluations, education, age, gender, attitudes toward the scope of government, and affect toward Hispanics.
Estimates from full models available in Online Appendix 6B5. should have notably different opinions on factors that might be detrimental to their group relative to whites who hold more ambivalent or even negative attitudes. If the extent to which white in-group attitudes are brought to bear on opinion is in part related to growing perceptions of threat, then we ought to expect that the relationship between white identity and immigration opinion should increase as levels of immigration in the United States grew. If we turn back to Figure 6 .1 and remind ourselves of trends in the rate of immigration to the United States, we see that while there was certainly an uptick in immigration between 1980 and 1990, it was not until 2000 that immigration rates leapt, approaching levels we had not seen since the early 1900s. Thus, we might not expect to see white in-group attitudes especially related to immigration opinion until after the year 2000, when immigration rates truly began to soar.
Source: 2016 ANES (Web
Surely, you might say, most white Americans were not so attuned to trends in immigration that they could describe the pattern outlined in Figure 6 .1. Certainly not. But what we would expect is that as the size of the immigrant population grew, news coverage of immigration ought to have increased as well. Valentino, Brader, and Jardina (2013) show, for instance, that the number of articles about Hispanic and Asian immigrants -groups considered non-white -increased between 1980 and 2011, but grew especially in the 2000s. What is more, Pérez (2010) shows that much of the immigration coverage about Latinos over this period was decidedly negative, and focused frequently on illegal immigration, especially in the mid 2000s.
We can also see that coverage of immigration generally, regardless of the group in question or the tone of that coverage, grew markedly over time. Figure 6 .5 plots the proportion of articles on immigration that appeared in the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post -three of the top newspapers in the country by circulation. 20 The rate at which these papers published articles mentioning immigration increased over the period, and especially as rates of immigration were peaking in the early to mid 2000s.
Does the relationship between white in-group attitudes and immigration opinion follow patterns in the salience of the immigration issue? To see, I regressed attitudes about our now familiar dependent variable -whether immigration levels should be increased, decreased, or kept the same -on whites' feeling thermometer evaluations of their own terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108645157.006 176 / White Identity Politics 1 7 6 group in each year the items were available between 1992 and 2016. For each model, when possible, I controlled for affect toward Hispanics, as well as for age, education level, employment status, personal financial assessments, national economic evaluations, party identity, ideology, and attitudes toward the size and scope of government. Figure 6 .6 presents the coefficients on both the white and Hispanic feeling thermometers for each model in each year, beginning in 1992. The lines running through the points represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. We can see that in 1992, the effect of the thermometer on opinion was fairly small. In 1994 and 1996, it was also relatively minimal, and statistically insignificant. By 2000, the effect was much larger, and remained significant in each year through 2016.
The results fit the expected pattern. The relationship between white in-group affect and immigration opinion was weak and inconsistent in the 1990s, before becoming more consistent and substantively effective in the mid to late 2000s. 21 In each year analyzed between 2004 and 2016, rating whites more positively on the thermometer was associated with greater support for decreasing levels of immigration, even after controlling for out-group attitudes. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Proportion of Articles
New York Times
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Figure 6.5 The Proportion of News Articles Mentioning Immigration over Time
The lines represent the proportion of articles, out of the total number of articles published in a year, mentioning immigrant or immigration, over time.
Source: www.newyorktimes.com, www.washingtonpost.com, Proquest Historical Archive (Los Angeles Times).
The significant effect in 1992, however, is slightly unexpected. Why might we have observed this relationship in 1992 in particular? Because immigration was likely a salient political topic in 1992, especially with regards to the presidential election. It was in this year, now over two decades ago, that Patrick J. Buchanan campaigned for the Republican nomination for president of the United States. Buchanan's campaign message feels remarkably familiar in today's political climate. He, like Donald Trump, railed against immigration, even advocating for the building of a fence along the southern border of the United States. It is therefore unsurprising that an election study picked up these associations when Buchanan was publicly arguing, even in 1992, that immigration was a threat to America's culture, and that immigration would eventually result in white Americans becoming a minority. The points represent the coefficient on the white feeling thermometer and the Hispanic feeling thermometer in each year (separate models). The lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. Model also controls for party identity, ideology, employment status, personal and national economic evaluations, education, age, and gender. Estimates from full models appear in Online Appendix 6C.
Source: ANES Time Series Cumulative File.
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Are Whites Threatened Where There Are More Immigrants?
While the results of the immigration analysis are compelling, they do not quite help us uncover whether the relationship between white identity and opposition to immigration is a result of group threat. How might we draw more direct conclusions in test of my broader theory? One way in which previous work tests the relationship between threat and moderating attitudes on outcomes or preferences is by experimentally introducing threat and demonstrating the subsequent activation of the relevant attitudes. When it comes to immigration opinion, however, white identity is already activated; in observational data, it appears as a strong and significant predictor in line with many of my theoretical expectations. But we might not expect all white identifiers in all circumstances to feel that out-groups pose a challenge to their group. In fact, a long line of work on racial threat has proposed that the racial context in which individuals reside can influence perceptions of threat. Much of this research argues that a sizeable and proximate population of nonwhites can increase perceptions of out-group threat or competition among whites. Generally, studies in this vein employ measures of the size of the non-white population as a measure of threat (Blalock 1967; Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006; Glaser 1994; Key 1949; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998) . Implicit in this research is the assumption that when proximate nonwhite populations are large, whites feel increasingly threatened, which subsequently influences the salience of whites' identity with their racial group. This identity is then linked to higher levels of racial hostility. The majority of this work, however, rarely demonstrates that whites possess an identification with their racial group, therefore missing an important step in a broader theoretical account.
Here, however, we can test these relationships directly, allowing us to further assess whether group threat is indeed an important moderator of opinion. Specifically, we can ask whether white identity is more strongly associated with opposition to immigration among whites who live in more racially diverse locales. To determine if we can in fact observe this relationship, I again turn to the 2012 ANES, which includes for each respondent, a geo-code that can be matched to Census data on various characteristics at the county level. Specifically, I want to know if the effect of white identity on opposition to immigration 1 7 9 is more powerful in counties with a greater change in the immigrant population.
I measure change in the immigrant population for each county between 2000 and 2010 using US Census estimates for the foreignborn population. The dependent variable for this analysis is the standard measure of immigration opinion -a preference for increasing, decreasing, or keeping levels of immigration the same. As usual, immigration opinion is coded such that higher values are associated with more restrictive preferences. In addition to accounting for the change in the immigrant population, I also control for demographic characteristics, out-group attitudes, personal economic circumstances, national economic evaluations, party identity, ideology and a preference for more limited government.
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Does the effect of white identity on immigration opinion become more potent as the change in the county-level foreign-born population increases? Figure 6 .7 suggests that is the case. The chart plots the marginal effect of white identity at each degree of change in the foreign-born population between 2000 and 2010. As the population becomes more diverse, white identity is associated with greater support for decreasing levels of immigration. Thus, the results provide some provocative evidence for the claim that white identity is brought to bear on opinions, in response to threat, in a manner consistent with protecting the group and its status.
Do Demographic Changes Threaten White Identifiers?
The US Census and demographers from other institutions have made a number of projections about the future racial and ethnic composition of the country. News coverage of these trends often focuses on the fact that whites will be a racial and ethnic minority by sometime around the year 2042. 23 Prior research has already demonstrated that whites feel threatened by this information (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005; Albertson and Gadarian 2013; Craig and Richeson 2014b; Myers and Levy 2018) . My argument, however, is that it is whites high on racial solidarity who ought to be especially threatened by information about the loss of their majority status and about increasing immigration.
One observable implication of experiencing threat to one's group comes from Intergroup Emotions Theory, which argues that individuals will experience emotions on behalf of their collective group terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108645157.006 180 / White Identity Politics 1 8 0 based on their appraisal of the group's security (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Smith, Seger, and Mackie 2007) . Events that are assessed as threatening to one's in-group should produce a negative emotional response (Albertson and Gadarian 2015) . Specifically, individuals should report feeling angry when they believe that their group is losing valuable resources or that their goals are being obstructed. They should feel fear when they perceive uncertainty about their group's well-being (Cottrell and Neuberg 2005) . Thus, we might observe that the impending relative loss of status due to demographic shifts or to increasing immigration should produce negative emotional reactions among whites who feel attached to their racial group. 24 Previous work demonstrates that emotional reactions have political implications; people tend to behave in ways consistent with their emotional reactions by, for example, by becoming more opposed to immigration and by seeking more information about the issue (Brader 2006; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008) . To determine whether white identifiers respond more negatively to information about demographic change, as part of the 2016 YouGov Study, I included an experimental component which presented subjects with information about whites' numerical status in the US population or about the changing immigrant population. The study was conducted over the two waves of the survey, and was comprised only of non-Hispanic white adult US citizens. In wave 1 of the study, conducted in October before the 2016 election, respondents were asked about their white identity and racial consciousness. Then at the beginning of wave 2 of the study, conducted just after the presidential election in November, respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. Respondents in each condition read between two and four sentences that described a chart pictured below the text. In each condition, care was taken to create parallelism between the provided text and the aesthetics of the graphs.
In the control condition, subjects viewed a (fictitious) chart accompanied by two sentences claiming that the number of cellphone-only households in the United States was on the rise. Subjects in the first treatment condition, or what I call the "white majority" condition, were presented with a similar graph, but this one described the projected population of whites and non-whites in the United States over the next forty years, claiming that whites will continue to comprise a majority of the population for the foreseeable future. Again, the chart and data were fictitious, and are inconsistent with current population projections. The graph was intended to present whites with non-threatening information about their group's status. In this condition, whites ought to be assured that their group will maintain its numerical majority. The second treatment condition, called the "white minority condition," was intended to exacerbate whites' concerns about the status of their group. Whites were presented with a graph that, consistent with real population projections, indicated their group would be a minority by 2042. 25 Finally, in the last treatment condition, referred to as the "increasing immigrants" condition, subjects viewed a graph illustrating that the number of foreign-born individuals in the United States was expected to rise sharply over the next terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108645157.006 182 / White Identity Politics 1 8 2 several decades. This condition allowed me to parse out any potential differences in reactions to demographic change generally compared to immigration, although my expectation is that the two conditions were prompt similar reactions.
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Following the implications of intergroup emotions theory, whites should report more negative emotions in response to the threatening "white displacement" and "increasing immigration" information compared to the control. We should not expect, however, that all whites feel negatively toward this information. Instead, it should be whites with higher levels of racial identity who are most reactive. Immediately following the presentation of the graphs, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they "felt" a number of emotions in reaction to the treatment. For analytical purposes, I scaled together the emotions into three categories: fear (uneasy, afraid, anxious), anger (angry, disgusted), and enthusiasm (happy, proud, hopeful).
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To determine whether my expectations with respect to white identifiers come to fruition, I regressed each emotion scale on white identity, indicators for the experimental treatments (with the control as the excluded category), and the interaction between white identity and the treatments. I find that compared to the control condition, in the "white majority" condition, whites, regardless of their level of racial identity, do not display any differences in their emotional reactions. There are, however, notable effects for whites who read the article indicating their group would become a minority, and for those who were told that immigration to the United States was increasing. I illustrate these effects in Figure 6 .8, which plots the predicted emotional response, across levels of white identity, for respondents in either the "white minority" or in the "increasing immigrants" condition.
In the "white minority" condition, whites with higher levels of racial identity reported notably higher levels of anger. Note that compared to those in the control, whites low on racial identity were less angry, and whites high on identity were more so. White identifiers were also more fearful, although the effect does not achieve statistical significance. By comparison, whites high on identity who were told that their group was becoming a minority, were also relatively less enthusiastic compared to those in the control. The effects among those who were told that the number of immigrants to the United States was expected to steadily increase were similar. Whites high on racial identity were much more angry and fearful in response to These results provide provocative evidence that whites high on racial identity are responding to threatening information about demographic change and immigration in a manner quite distinct from whites who possess lower levels of racial solidarity. The findings here are consistent not only with intergroup emotions theory, but with my larger theoretical framework, which argues that dominant group members who identify with their group will respond especially negatively to threats to their groups' position.
Conclusion
I have argued that immigration is especially tied to white racial identity. From the time the first European settlers arrived on American soil, the country has been dominated by individuals of white, Anglo-Saxon heritage. This means that the social, economic, and political power and very identity of the nation is inextricably tied up in the cultural and racial identity of white Americans. The wave of new immigrant groups that have sought refuge in this country, who have looked to build their own lives, and to raise families, have also led many whites to feel as if their racial group has been threatened. White identifiers perceive these immigrants as arriving with darker skin, foreign languages, and with unfamiliar traditions. They view immigrants as having come to this country in great numbers, and believe they threaten to alter the racial and ethnic composition of the United States. In short, immigration, by its very nature, is seen by some whites as provoking a challenge to whiteness.
Despite the great American myth that our country is a "nation of immigrants," American citizens have never looked especially favorably upon rising levels of immigration. This dismay for new waves of immigrants was true in the 1920s, and it is no less true today. Not all Americans are equally opposed to opening our borders and welcoming newcomers from abroad. White Americans are far more opposed to increasing immigration than are blacks or Hispanics. Not all whites, however, view immigration unfavorably. A number of factors drive some whites to adopt more negative immigration attitudes, including terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108645157.006 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 52.11.211.149, on 18 Jan 2020 at 13:16:46, subject to the Cambridge Core 185 / The Preservation of Whiteness 1 8 5 their national economic evaluations, partisanship and political ideology, education, and attitudes toward Hispanics. What I have demonstrated is that there is another important component to this story; whites who identify more with their racial group, and who possess a sense of racial consciousness, are far more opposed to immigration, all else equal. These same whites are also much more likely to believe that immigration introduces negative consequences for the nation.
This finding is powerful and robust. It holds across time and over multiple sources of evidence. What is more, regardless of the nature of the question white Americans are asked about immigration, it is clear they are viewing the issue through the lens of their racial identity. These results are consistent with my overarching expectations about the role of white racial solidarity in American politics. Immigration is an issue that deeply challenges the status of white Americans. Population changes as a result of immigration threaten to displace whites numerically, and immigrants challenge the notion of America as a prototypically white nation. The issue is a fundamental source of status threat for whites in the United States. Therefore, as expected, white racial solidarity is tightly linked to whites' immigration attitudes.
One implication of what I have described is that the extent to which white identity is brought to bear on public opinion ought to be contingent on how salient or significant the issue of immigration becomes in the public mind (Hopkins 2010). I have shown that as immigration rates in the United States grew between the early 1990s and the present, so did national news coverage of immigration. When the news media turns its attention to immigration, or when a politician capitalizes on anti-immigrant sentiment in order to mount a campaign, we ought to see the link between white identity and immigration opinion strengthen. The over-time analysis presented here provides some evidence that the power of white identity has expanded as levels of immigration to the United States have climbed. As the United States continues to diversify, and as the white population shrinks relative to the non-white population in the United States, we might see the impact of white identity and white consciousness grow.
The results from the diversity experiment demonstrate that white identifiers do indeed respond to information about immigration and demographic changes in a manner quite distinct from whites with moderate to low levels of white identity. When faced with information 1 8 6 about their pending loss of majority status or of increased immigration, white identifiers report feeling significantly angrier and less enthusiastic. They are also somewhat more fearful. Taken together, these results suggest that whites who are more attached to their racial group do see immigration as a threat to their group, and consequently, their racial identity is an important component of their opinions, fueling their anti-immigrant and immigration attitudes.
